We thank all the reviewers for their comments.

Reviewer 1:

- R does not contain enough statistics to estimate effective resistances. Effective resistances of m edges graph depends
- on both left and right singular space: it is the diagonal entries of matrix $E_{\mathcal{G}}^{\top}L_{\mathcal{G}}^{\dagger}E_{\mathcal{G}}$. We can approximate $L_{\mathcal{G}}^{\dagger}$ by R, but we need to also approximate the left singular space of $E_{\mathcal{G}}$ for the left and right multiplication in the above expression.
- As for the complexity, the preprocessing time matches current state-of-the art result of Gupta et al. [28] as they also
- require solving a quadratic program of Alon-Naor (since we can also answer (S,T)-cut queries, it is only fair to
- compare with Gupta et al.; Blocki et al. only answer queries when $T = V \setminus S$). The total time to compute all τ_i for
- $1 \le i \le m$ is $O(n^3)$. Solving a semi-definite program takes poly(n) time, where the exact polynomial depends on 9
- whether we use interior point, ellipsoid method, or primal-dual approach of Arora-Kale. Rest of all the computations is
- subsumed by this run-time. However, now solving any (S,T)-cut query requires $O(\min |S|, |T|/\varepsilon^2)$ time instead of 11
- $O(n^2)$ time required by Gupta et al. while achieving better accuracy bound. On top of that, since we now work with 12
- sparse-graph, the run time of solving MAX-CUT and SPARSEST-CUT decreases significantly as the existing SDP 13
- based algorithms have a large polynomial dependence on the number of edges.

Reviewer 2:

Note that edges that have high leverage score are more likely to be retained in the graph (this is necessary for the 16

- utility/accuracy) but we also have plausible deniability for that edge, i.e., the edge could be in the output graph due 17
- to the overlaid complete graph. How to balance the two is the subtle part of setting the appropriate parameters which 18
- follows from analyzing the error bound. This is true for any differential privacy application, there is no absolute privacy. 19
- We necessarily have to "leak" some information (in a controlled manner) to get some utility out of the analysis. We 20
- discuss this briefly on lines 103-106, and lines 154-156. 21
- Regarding the comment about "the tradeoff due to privacy, the privacy cost, cannot be understood in the current paper".
- the whole point of giving the error bound is to crisply characterize that tradeoff. What we show (refer to Table 1) is that 23
- if we require stronger privacy guarantee (by making privacy parameter α smaller), the upper bound on the error gets 24
- worse (as $1/\alpha$). This is a typical tradeoff in applications of differential privacy.

Reviewer 3: 26

- We do not think that the reviewer has even tried to read the paper as all of our response amounts to basically providing
- pointers to the text in the paper. None of their comments support/justify the overly harsh evaluation. We urge the AC to 28
- intervene and politely request to not consider the comments of the reviewer. Please see more details below. 29
- Motivation/significance: We discuss a clear application to machine learning on lines 281-300. In particular, we discuss 30
- how to extend our results for private manifold learning using Laplacian eigenmaps. More generally, as we argue in the 31
- paper, graph analysis finds application in many problems in data science and machine learning. We focus on graph 32
- sparsification as it is central to many graph analysis problems. This is clearly spelled out in the Introduction. More 33
- precisely, the opening paragraph motivates the need for private analysis on graphs on lines 10-17, lists numerous
- applications of graph analysis on lines 29-36, and finally discusses why graph sparsification plays a central role (on 35
- lines 44-47 and lines 62-67). 36
- Algorithm: There is a whole subsection (Section 3.1 on lines 129-163) that details each and every step of the algorithm, 37
- and provides motivation and justification for each part. We find the comments by the reviewer as frivolous since answer 38
- to each of their questions is easily accessible in that part of the paper. The algorithm is very clearly described in the text. 39

General comment regarding empirical evaluation:

- This is an algorithms+theory paper. We give a general framework for privatizing analysis on graph. There is no 41
- single application here, our results simultaneously apply to many problems. Besides as per the CFP, "Algorithmic 42
- contributions should have at least an illustration of how the algorithm might eventually materialize into a machine 43
- learning application." We give more than just illustrations, we give concrete applications as we discussed above and a 44
- complete result for manifold learning. We disagree with the Reviewer 3 about the scope of NeurIPS. 45
- More importantly, the applications are well established and studied, we would be reproducing old experiments without
- adding any value. The point here is that the performance of the algorithms does not suffer much while guaranteeing 47
- privacy. Establishing privacy empirically is not straightforward and therefore, many papers in the privacy track are not 48
- accompanied by experiments.