We cannot thank the reviewers enough for their valuable feedback on our work. Below we provide the response and comments on their remarks and questions.

**Reviewers 1 and 2: Combine guess loss with additive noise.** Due to the time constraints of the rebuttal, we limited ourselves to a single setup: two methods combined with the same sets hyperparameters as in the main paper. This combination of the guess loss with the additive noise beats the out-of-the-box CycleGAN on the GTA dataset in terms of the translation accuracy but performed weaker than the individual solutions we proposed, supposedly due to the non-optimal choice of hyperparameters (weight of the guess loss and $\sigma$ of the Gaussian noise). We will test more hyperparameters and provide an extended analysis for all three metrics in the camera-ready version of the paper.

**Reviewer 1: No other methods to compare with, so it is hard to say if their method is much better than existing methods.** To our knowledge, we are the first to develop a defense technique that addresses specifically the self-adversarial attack. Most recent advances in adversarial defense methods address “black-box attacks” performed by a third party against a fixed model using additive signal with known properties (i.e. bounded norm) that alters models predictions in a specified way. In the self-adversarial setting, however, the attack is performed by the generative model itself to reconstruct the information that is lost during translation and is a natural consequence of the imposed cycle constraint. Since the self-adversarial attack is performed implicitly during the translation, we can not extract the embedded signal, or even understand its true nature or measure its properties. Also, the “attacker” in this case constantly adapts to the setting and fine-tunes the embedding as the discriminator learns to detect it. Therefore, black-box methods are of lesser use for the self-adversarial defense. Moreover, both the additive noise and the guess loss methods build upon ideas of state-of-art defenses against the white-box adaptive attacks, namely, gradient penalties and the “adversarial training”. The latter incorporates adversarial examples during training to increase the model’s robustness to the attack. Since we cannot explicitly model the structured noise produced by the self-adversarial attack, and cannot acquire the non-adversarial translations that do not contain the self-adversarial noise, we cannot apply the adversarial training directly to each of the two translation networks. Instead, we note that the reconstructed image tends to be almost identical to the input but must contain the adversarial noise since the model is not aware of the origin of the input. Therefore the reconstructed image can serve as an adversarially perturbed example of the non-adversarial input image. We provide both non-adversarial input image and the adversarial reconstruction to the guess discriminator so that it could detect and penalize the presence of the structured noise. Additionally, our goal was to improve the performance of the cycle-consistent translation methods by defending them against the self-adversarial attack and thus making them rely more on the visual characteristics of the input rather than on the hidden embedding, so we believe that comparing our “defended” CycleGAN with the classic CycleGAN, UNIT, and MUNIT is a good baseline comparison.

**Reviewer 3: Novelty is not enough as most of the proposed solution or observations are already published.** While the presence of the self-adversarial attack in the CycleGAN model was previously reported [5], we 1) show that this phenomenon is present in all major unsupervised translation methods that incorporate the cycle-consistency loss; 2) more importantly, we are the first to propose defense techniques against this particular attack, as well as 3) a set of metrics that reveal the degree of embedding and the robustness of the model to the self-adversarial behaviour. While adding noise is a heavily used technique (e.g. for regularization), we would like to stress that this paper is the first systematic analysis of the effect the additive noise has on the robustness of the cyclic translation models against the self-adversarial attack. As for the pairwise discriminator, we would like to emphasize that our loss discriminates an image from its own perturbed version. That sets it aside from other pairwise GAN losses, such as the relativistic GAN loss that predicts which of two different images is real and which is fake, conditional discriminators that use an image together with the corresponding conditioner from a different domain (e.g. a segmentation map), and, to our knowledge, all other actively used discriminator losses with multiple inputs. Moreover, no prior work utilized and evaluated the effectiveness of such discriminators in defending GANs against adversarial attacks.

**Reviewer 3: I would suggest authors make more effort to justify the proposed defense techniques and providing insight that why the defense techniques could help to solve the problem.** E.g. how do I know if or not this method actually forces the model to "hide" info in another way?

Figure 5 in the original submission illustrates a qualitative method for determining whether a given model exhibits the embedding behavior of any kind. Consider images with accurately estimated segmentation maps (A2B matches ground truth B). We observe that the CycleGAN model produced perfect reconstructions (A2B2A) that are very different from respective translations of ground truth segmentation maps (B2A), whereas reconstructions generated by the models with either additive noise or the guess loss match respective segmentation translations much better, suggesting that these models did not rely on any hidden information during reconstruction. More examples can be found in the supplementary. Unfortunately, this intuitive qualitative metric is difficult to measure quantitatively as it requires common sense understanding of features that could and could not be inferred from segmentation maps alone (e.g. road marking position can be, but car colors can not), and the difficulty of estimating perceptual similarity between images of natural scenes; the proposed “honesty” metric leverages a pre-trained pix2pix model to measure perceptual similarity.